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1 Introduction
A common refrain in eliciting lessons from
experiences with development initiatives is that
the outcomes depend critically on ‘context’
(Booth 2011). This is also true of the range of
recent social accountability (SA) initiatives that
are increasingly popular among donors and civil
society organisations (Ringold et al. 2012; McGee
and Gaventa 2011; Foresti, O’Neil and Hudson
2007).1 Despite this general consensus, there is
limited progress on understanding exactly how
‘context’ affects outcomes; and the related
question of exactly which contextual factors
matter. Dictionary definitions of context help
illustrate the problem: ‘the conditions and
circumstances that are relevant to the event or fact’
(Free Dictionary);2 ‘the general situation within
which something happens that helps to explain
it’ (Macmillan);3 ‘the circumstances that form
the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and
in terms of which it can be fully understood’
(Oxford English Dictionary).4 The ambiguity in
these definitions lies in the fact that which
‘circumstances’, ‘conditions’ and ‘general situation’
are relevant to the event is subjective. So how can
we get a handle on which elements of context are
relevant to understanding success and failure?
In this article, drawing on the large and growing
reported experience with local social
accountability processes, I suggest that there are
two broad parts to the issue – the macro and the
micro. On the macro side, there is now increasing
acknowledgement that accountability processes
are better viewed as located within larger histories
of citizen–state engagement and related political
processes (Fox 2007; Joshi and Houtzager 2012).
This recognition has led scholars to identify broad
features of the context that seem to matter for
outcomes. The macro approach, which has
dominated the limited existing literature, largely
focuses on particular socioeconomic and political
realities at the country level. What we have
learned to date from this approach is elaborated
briefly in Section 2 following this introduction.
At the micro level, local factors can clearly drive
the way certain SA initiatives unfold and the
extent to which they are successful even within
otherwise broadly similar contexts. For example,
very similar initiatives intended to provide
information to communities in order to support
accountability demands and improve educational
outcomes could have different impacts despite
being in similar country contexts (Pandey, Goyal
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and Sundararaman 2009). Yet, few have explored
why this might be the case and how one might
approach issues of context at the local level. The
main contribution of this article is an elaboration
of the individual components of social
accountability at the local level, and a ‘theory of
change or causal chain’ strategy to gain traction
on the thorny issue of micro-context. Such a
strategy is elaborated in Section 3. The argument
is that two broad aspects are important in
understanding the micro-context: (a) the features
of the individual components of accountability
processes and (b) the causal chains through
which social accountability processes linking
these broad components are expected to work.
The disaggregation of components of information,
citizen action and state response is carried out in
Section 4. A preliminary relatively linear causal
chain is mapped in Section 5, which could be used
as a potentially basic frame on which complex
chains could be developed. The conclusions,
presented in Section 6, map out the implications
of this approach to context.
2 The macro-context: broad political economy
features
Over the years, there have been several attempts
to systematically understand the larger
contextual factors that influence the outcomes of
development initiatives under various
frameworks such as the ‘drivers of change’
approach, or more recently political economy
analysis (PEA) and power analysis (PA) (Pettit
and Mejía Acosta, this IDS Bulletin). The idea is
to identify factors that are enabling or
constraining with respect to change, given the
particularities of socioeconomic and political
conditions in a country or context (Routley and
Hulme 2013). Driven by the unpredictability of
outcomes of similar developmental initiatives in
different contexts, the drivers of change/political
economy approach attempts to expose the
underlying power relationships, incentives and
interests among broad groups that might affect
whether specific reforms will have traction in
specific contexts. A recent definition of PEA
crystallises the thinking behind these approaches:
[P]olitical economy analysis investigates how
political and economic processes interact in a
given society, and support or impede the ability
to solve development problems that require
collective action. It takes particular account of
the interests and incentives driving the
behaviour of different groups and individuals,
the distribution of power and wealth between
them, and how these relationships are created,
sustained and transformed over time
(Unsworth and Williams 2011).
Practical toolkits have been developed by several
organisations as a guide for undertaking PEA
(Fritz, Kaiser and Levy 2009; DFID 2009). These
toolkits contain several guiding questions about
contextual features in different aspects of
analysis (e.g. the business–state relationship,
state dependence on earned revenues, etc.).
Some thinking has also gone into developing
guides to PEA in particular sectors (Moncrieffe
and Luttrell 2005; EC/Europeaid 2008; Reich
and Balarajan 2012).
In the field of social accountability, such macro-
contextual analysis is relatively new. Although
country-level contextual analysis for social
accountability, not surprisingly, shares many
features with general PEA, it also tends to focus on
particular features; for example, freedom of media,
as they are directly related to SA initiatives. Further,
studies have sought to identify factors that run
across instances of success (Bukenya, Hickey and
King 2012; Bukenya and King 2012; McGee and
Gaventa 2011; Joshi 2013). Some of the common
lessons include: (1) that information and
transparency is necessary but not sufficient for
accountability actions to be undertaken; (2) that
accountability action without a corresponding
capacity for state response can be
counterproductive; (3) that effective sanctions
play an important role in sustaining accountability
demands; (4) that collective action is important
for accountability to the poor; and (5) that
existing cases of successful social accountability
are underpinned by cross-boundary alliances
between social actors and state reformists that
create accountability coalitions.
O’Meally (2013) offers a recent, and relatively
comprehensive review of the literature on
contextual factors that matter for social
accountability. Because this is one of the most
recent attempts to provide a framework for
analysing context, it is useful to go into it in
some detail here. His take on contextual factors
is explicitly political. The underlying meta-
theory of change that underpins successful social
accountability and drives his contextual analysis
is that:
Joshi Reading the Local Context: A Causal Chain Approach to Social Accountability24
1 Joshi_Schultze-Kraft IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:50  Page 24
if pro-accountability and pro-poor networks in
society are adequately resourced and build
coalitions with pro-accountability networks and
actors in political society through rounds of
state–society bargaining and interaction; and,
if these coalitions are able to: (a) negotiate
changes with anti-change actors; (b) generate
sufficient counter-veiling power to change
governing elite incentives and challenge the
primary/secondary political settlement;
and/or (c) active contextually legitimate
accountability mechanisms…
… then, this might result in (a) coercion – a
backlash from existing power-holders;
(b) co-optation and collaboration –
incremental improvements in accountability
relations and developmental gains within the
existing political settlement; and/or (c) change
– more fundamental change, to differing
degrees, leading to the formation of a ‘new’
political settlement/social contract (O’Meally
2013: 29–30).
It is clear from this very broad theory of change,
that the contextual conditions that matter range
from the deep-rooted structures in society, for
example, political settlements, to more tractable
features, for example, the nature of civil society
organisations. Capturing the range of factors
that might be included in such analysis is vast –
and O’Meally identifies six broad ‘contextual
domains’: (a) civil society, (b) political society,
(c) inter-elite relations and the political
settlement; (d) state–society relations and the
social contract; (e) intra-society relations and
issues of social inclusion; and (f) global factors.
These are then further broken down into various
aspects that have a bearing on their enabling or
constraining potential.
The characteristics of these domains in particular
contexts can point to the feasibility of social
accountability as a specific strategy for improving
services, empowering citizens and strengthening
governance. The main messages from O’Meally’s
(2013) review of context suggests that
practitioners should think politically when
considering social accountability, link social
accountability strategies to prevailing institutions
of political accountability, work to enhance state
capacity to respond to generated demand,
support pro-accountability coalitions that cut
across the state–society divide, learn by doing
and use longer time horizons, take account of
global influences on accountability, build on
existing processes and make issues of inclusion
and exclusion more central to accountability
processes. Some have undertaken further work to
highlight the constraints and entry points for
social accountability work in typified contexts,
for example relatively closed polities (Gandhi,
forthcoming) or fragile states (Boeckman 2012).
While this work advances our thinking
considerably on the features of context that
seem to matter, these are still very broad
messages and pose the challenge of how to
operationalise them in particular local contexts.
3 The micro-context: assumptions and causal
chains
While the contextual factors identified in the
studies discussed above (particularly O’Meally
2013) are useful in providing key questions that
practitioners should be asking about various
domains in specific kinds of polities, they do not
help in suggesting which particular strategies
are likely to work. Rather they help identify
whether SA as a general approach should be
considered or not.
Yet, developmental actors require signposts of a
more detailed kind. Are community scorecards
more appropriate or are social audits better in
specific contexts? Should collective action focus on
pursuing rights claims through existing complaint
mechanisms or should one organise street
protests? Are information provision strategies
likely to be successful, or is the creation of strong
channels of grievance redress? What combinations
of approaches work in specific settings? What
potential bottlenecks are likely to emerge? What
essential factors need to be in place before
attempting particular strategies? While
practitioners regularly take decisions on these
kinds of questions, based on a range of factors,
including their own capacity, past experience with
approaches, and so forth, they could be better
informed by a clearer understanding of the
lessons from what initiatives have worked in the
past, and in what contexts.
So how are we to make judgements of this kind
from the evidence (limited as it is) that exists?
We know from the literature that even lessons
from the most highly regarded evaluation studies
– randomised controlled trials (RCTs) – of social
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accountability interventions have problems with
generalisability of the results (external validity)
(Woolcock 2009; Ravallion 2009).
In fact, an insightful reflection highlights several
issues with prevailing interpretations of the
existing evidence to date, especially evidence of
failure (Fox 2014). The most widely cited studies,
rather than suggesting that social accountability
does not work, actually point to some of the
conditions that make it work. Foremost, in
keeping with the wider literature, across the
studies evidence shows that information alone is
not enough to spark community action and
subsequent provider response. One needs
supporting processes for collective action.
Similarly, neither is community monitoring from
below enough to get service improvements;
mainly because it lacks bite. Rather, combined
with other accountability mechanisms (e.g. top
down accountability, or sanctions with teeth), it
can have the desired effects. Finally, elite capture
is a real problem in community-focused
programmes, including social accountability
ones. Fox concludes from the evidence that we
need to rethink some of our basic propositions of
accountability work to move from a focus on
‘tactical’ approaches to more ‘strategic’ ones.
Given these challenges and the general problem
of context posed by accountability work, in a
recent paper Cartwright and Munro (2010),
elaborate on the problem of external validity and
outline two conditions that are important in
extrapolating the causal inferences made in a
particular study context to another: (a) the study
and the target population are the same with
respect to the probability of their relevant
compositions; and (b) the study and target
population are the same with respect to the
causal laws for the outcomes. Yet, randomisation
does not deal with the latter issue. In other
words, the processes that make the mechanism
work, may not be the same. To generalise we
need to understand specific features of context.
As they highlight:
Most causal and probabilistic relations relied on
in health care and social practice are not
fundamental: they do not just hold, they hold on
account of some underlying structure that gives
rise to them. When the structures are different,
so too are the causal and probabilistic relations
they create (Cartwright and Munro 2010: 261).
Thus, they point to the need for unpacking the
initiatives in terms of a theory of change or
causal chain, in order to understand how desired
outcomes might work.
Increasingly, this approach to SA initiatives is
being seen as a promising one (World Bank 2013;
Vogel 2012; Tembo 2012; Lieberman, Posner and
Tsai 2012; Holland and Thirkell 2009). In ground-
breaking new work that parallels the approach of
this article, the World Bank is elaborating on key
elements of social accountability and the factors
that drive them by re-examining the evidence we
have from evaluation research, but also from
behavioural economics, anthropology and
political science which allows for testing links in
implicit causal chains for their robustness (World
Bank 2013; World Bank, forthcoming). A theory
of change/causal chain approach allows one to
understand implicit assumptions underlying
particular activities, the conditions that are
enabling or constraining as well the extent to
which initiatives travel through the assumed
causal chain and reach intermediate objectives
even if the final outcomes are not those
expected. This approach can, in particular,
identify bottlenecks in the causal chain that can
be responsible for some observed adverse
outcomes.
In taking up the task of unpacking causal chains,
we propose that two aspects are important to
understand the potential of particular
approaches in specific settings: the components of
the pathway plus the mechanisms (and related micro-
contextual factors) through which each of the
components could lead to the other. An analogy
from the physical world might be useful here.
Suppose we want to push an object from location
A to B. We can use different mechanisms to do
this – we could place wheels under the object and
roll it to B; we could push it to location B, we
could lift the object and place it at B. The
mechanism in this example is the means we use to
relocate the object. However, each of these
mechanisms will operate dependent upon the
specificities of the component (object) itself – the
object may be lifted because it is light, or
because it may be dismantled and carried piece
by piece. It is also important to note that the
actual enabling conditions might look different
in different cases due to some micro-contextual5
conditions; for example, we can use wheels if the
path to B is relatively smooth. Often we assume
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these conditions are in place because they seem
ubiquitous in the cases where the intervention
works and we would not pay attention to them.
However, they underpin why some initiatives
work, and may not be present in specific
instances we are concerned with, and thus lead
to intervention failure. Overall, the role the
enabling micro-context plays is the same – in
terms of enabling the mechanism to work. For
any specific component, we need to understand
both how the mechanism works and the micro-
context/component in order to see whether
particular strategies will help us reach the
outcome we desire.
One additional consideration is necessary before
beginning to unpack SA. One can take two
different approaches to what one means by an
SA ‘intervention’. On the one hand, one can
differentiate by common SA interventions – for
example, community scorecards, social audits
and so forth – and elaborate an evaluation
framework and a theory of change for each. This
has been the prevailing approach in several
studies (Foresti et al. 2007; Barr et al. 2012). On
the other hand, one might start from a more
general broad theory of change that underpins
ideas about demand for good governance and
citizen-led accountability. This might comprise a
series of steps that combine in different ways in
common SA initiatives – for example, awareness
raising, information demands, protests, etc.
(Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Although less
prevalent in the literature, I take this approach
in the article for reasons that will become
evident in the next section.
4 Unpacking the accountability black box:
information, citizen action and state response
If one starts from the point of disaggregating
social accountability into its component parts
(rather than looking at ‘labelled’ interventions
such as social audits, community monitoring,
etc.), then as a first step one will have to
separate its broad components. While this might
be done in different ways (see World Bank,
forthcoming), and will vary depending upon the
nature of the citizen groups and the target of
accountability actions among other things, we
know that social accountability has something to
do with three broad things: information, citizen
action and state responses.
The conventional assumptions have been that
the provision of some kind of information/
transparency will lead to citizen action, which
will then together lead to state response (see
Figure 1). This unidirectional causal chain often
implicitly underpins SA initiatives.
However, the relationship between these three
components is not so straightforward – each of
the arrows, from information, to citizen action to
state response, could work in the other direction
(see Figure 2). For example, citizen action
through mobilisation could lead to the
generation or exposure of relevant information.
State responses may encourage or restrain
citizen action. State responses can also take the
form of making previously opaque information
public. And sometimes, the revelation of
information can directly spur state responses
without being mediated through citizen action. It
seems clear that the linkages between these
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Figure 1 Assumed link between information, citizen action and state response 
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three components are not as straightforward as
assumed in the unidirectional causal chain.
In addition to the complexity of the multiple
pathways of interaction between these three
components, the nature of the component itself
matters. All information is not equal; all citizen
action is not the same and all state responses
cannot be seen as accountability enhancing.
Although most scholars and practitioners, if
questioned, would acknowledge the qualitative
differences between different types of
information, citizen action and state response,
curiously the literature treats them all alike,
especially when attempting to aggregate lessons
on social accountability. This ambiguity calls for
a closer conceptual look at the nature of each
component of social accountability.
4.1 Information
There are several issues related to the nature of
information in social accountability processes.
First and foremost is the issue of usefulness: as
Fox (2007) puts it, is the information opaque or
clear? If the information is provided in a form
that is not understandable or actionable then it is
unlikely to trigger collective action (Fung, Graham
and Weil 2007). Usually, whether information is
opaque or transparent depends upon the source
of the information, and the incentives people
have for full and clear disclosure.
Second is the credibility of the information
source – it is likely to be accurate and reliable?
Does the information provider have incentives to
distort or obfuscate information? If the
information is produced through a process in
which citizens have participated then it is more
likely to be credible and legitimate. On the other
hand, information provided by governments will
be considered more authoritative when
considering state responses. When the
information used in accountability demands is
generated through a process involving both
providers and users, then it is likely to have more
legitimacy for all stakeholders.
Third, there is the issue of whether the
information provided is about official standards,
(of either/both processes and outputs) or
whether the information is about performance in
relation to other similarly placed comparators.
On the one hand, when the information relates
to established standards, then citizens are
expected to mobilise and demand performance
up to the official standards, which may be
unrealistic. On the other hand, when
information is about performance and is
comparative (e.g. lead tables in the UK), citizens
may be provoked by realising that similarly
placed groups are receiving better services than
them for no rational reason. Here the trigger for
collective action is competition among localities
(or groups) based on more realistic expectations.
Fourth, information can have an inspirational
effect.6 Stories of successful citizen action leading
to greater state responsiveness and improved
services elsewhere, can catalyse a ‘we can do it
too’ spirit in communities that might otherwise
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Figure 2 Potential dynamic links between information, citizen action and state response 
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not consider accountability demands. The lessons
from success here are not so much the actual
citizen action or pathways through which
accountability gains were made, as much as the
fact that it is possible to gain success in
accountability claims at all, despite difficult
environments.
These four aspects of information (and there
might be others) imply different causal paths for
usage as a part of the accountability process.
Each potential pathway has a set of assumptions
that underlie it. For example, there is no reason
to believe that clear information from a non-
credible source will trigger citizen demands for
accountability. Or when information is about
standards that are out of reach, there may be
little faith in state responsiveness. Starting with
categorising the nature of information on the
four aspects can throw light about the possible
paths that link information with both citizen
action and state responses.
4.2 Citizen action
Similar to the discussion on information, the
content of citizen action can be broken down into
several elements (Joshi and Houtzager 2012).
First, citizens can demand information from
governments related to budgets and spending,
processes, standards and performance. Often
budgets and expenditures can be skewed towards
the better off, processes and entitlements are not
well understood, and the actual performance of
government remains opaque. This is the reason
why information campaigns often accompany SA
initiatives.
Second, citizen action itself can generate relevant
information – for example, through perception
surveys, expenditure tracking or budget analysis.
Such information, as discussed previously, is likely
to be viewed more credibly by communities due to
the legitimacy of its collation. Simultaneously, the
process of demanding or gathering information,
however, might itself spark off greater mobilisation
for accountability.
Third, societal actors can keep a watch on
services through ongoing monitoring of the
actual quality of public goods being delivered.
Are teachers absent from classes? Are medical
supplies in stock? Are officials demanding bribes
for services? Are contractors using appropriate
materials as per specifications? These issues are
best scrutinised by those who are close to the
services in question and are able to monitor
performance on a regular basis. Such ongoing
monitoring forms part of accountability action,
but need not require state response if nothing is
found to be amiss.
Fourth, if monitoring and information gathering
shows that there are gaps between expected and
delivered levels of service, then further citizen
action is required in terms of seeking
accountability. Such action can involve making
demands to enforce legal standards that are not
currently being met, or explanations of why it is
not feasible. For example, communities may
demand more teachers in a school if the teacher
pupil ratio is below that established by law. This
is an important element of social accountability:
to give governments opportunities to remedy the
situation when suitably informed or provide
credible explanations of why the standards
cannot be met.
Finally, if dissatisfied with the explanations
provided, or if corruption is exposed, social
groups can seek grievance redress. This could be
done either through existing administrative
complaint mechanisms, political protests or
litigation. If grievance redress channels do not
exist, citizen action may take the form of
demands for them to be established.
Which of the above actions are actually
undertaken depends upon various factors
including whether communities are mobilised,
past experience of interactions with the state,
and cultures of expectations from the state. In
addition, these various actions can be combined
in different ways in sequence, or in parallel.
Underpinning each of these actions, is a set of
assumptions about how these might work.
4.3 State response
Within the literature on social accountability, the
least explored aspect is that of state response.
While the key expectation is that public officials
will respond to citizen action and make
improvements, the actual substance of their
response can vary considerably including
generating and releasing information, to
reforming processes, mobilising resources,
advocating for reforms at higher levels and
changing their own behaviour. They could also
initiate investigations of wrongdoings and
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sanction those responsible. On the negative side,
they could instigate reprisals and ignore
reputational taints. What sorts of citizen action
trigger particular responses, and in what
contexts? While there is consensus that social
accountability advocates should focus on state
inclination and capacity to respond, there is little
understanding of why officials might take certain
actions rather than others (for an exception see
Aiyar and Mehta 2014). Unpacking the
assumptions we make in expecting state responses
to citizen action will be key to understanding the
micro-contextual factors that matter.
For each of the components: of information,
citizen action and state response, there are
associated processes depending upon the form
components take. Information can be generated
through crowd sourcing, perception surveys,
participatory research or monitoring and be
made public through a variety of channels,
including the media. State responses can be in
the form of behaviour changes, public sector
reform, retaliation against claimants, and
sanctions against those responsible. Each of
these processes that circumscribe particular
elements has an associated set of assumptions
that underpin them which are illustrated in
Table 1.
5 Tracing causal chains
In the previous section, we examined each
component of the black box more carefully to
understand its nature and sub-parts. In this
section, we focus on the relationships between the
components – the pathways through which each
component is expected to lead to the others. In
order to do this, we start by tracing causal chains,
assuming rational, self-interested individuals.
Further work might expand such causal chains
based on advances in behavioural economics and
social psychology that elaborate more realistically
on patterns of human behaviour.7 In the following
we examine an illustrative and the most common
causal chain for social accountability – the
pathway from information to state response –
although there are other equally valid pathways
to accountability.
There is a widespread expectation that providing
information to the poor and disadvantaged will
spur them into demanding better services. In fact
several interventions have been premised on such
an assumption (Banerjee et al. 2010; Pandey et al.
2009; Khemani 2008). Yet many studies suggest
that information has little or no effect (Bruns,
Filmer and Patrinos 2011). Similarly, social
accountability is based on the belief that citizen
action leads to positive outcomes (service delivery,
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Table 1 A broad categorisation of components
Component Content Process Assumptions/Micro-context
Information Performance Transparency Literacy/access
– Compared to standards Generating new Legitimacy/credibility of
– Compared to others information (e.g. perception information
Inspirational data, monitoring data)
Media campaigns
Citizen action Demand information Formal bureaucracy Priorities
Generate information Protests Belief in efficacy of channel
Monitor performance Political articulation Sense of entitlements
Seek accountability Formal complaint channels
Seek grievance redress Litigation
State response Release information Transparency Legitimacy of grievance
Reform processes Reduced corruption Capacity
Increase resources Behaviour change Public service motivations
Demands at higher levels Formal and informal Reputational concerns
Investigation/sanctions channels of reform demands Channels of influencing 
Formal and informal higher levels
channels of enquiry and 
punishment
Source Author’s own.
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governance, empowerment). Yet we know that
citizen action leads to such outcomes only in some
cases; in others it leads to frustration, and
occasionally reprisal (Gaventa and Barrett 2010).
Finally, state responses to citizen action are
necessary for the desired outcomes, yet it is not
clear why officials respond positively in some cases
and not others. So what are the steps in the causal
chain where the information to citizen action path
might break down?
Lieberman et al. (2012) present a fascinating
exploration of why a large-scale information
campaign to disseminate the results of
literacy/numeracy assessments and materials to
help children’s learning and citizen participation
in education in Tanzania had no impacts on
citizen action. In their own initial work, a
randomised controlled trial of the initiative found
no treatment effect for the intervention (i.e. none
of the observed citizen participation could be
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Information quality
(Characteristics of the information type)
Is the information new and unexpected?
Ð
Is the information understandable?
Ð
Does the information highlight gaps in performance?
(As compared to standards, expectations or comparators)
Ð
Is the information widely publicised?
Ð
Is the information credible?
(Who has provided information, is it legitimate due to
processes of generation?)
Citizen action
(Unpack motivations)
Did I receive the information?
Ð
Do I understand the information?
Ð
Is the situation worse than expected?
Ð
Do I care?
Ð
Can I do anything about it?
Ð
Do I think my actions will have impact?
Ð
If I need others will they join?
Collective action/strategy
(Substantive characteristics of citizen demands)
Who is likely to be responsive?
Ð
What framing are they likely to listen to? (Moral appeals,
legal obligations, humanitarian grounds, political stability)
Ð
Are there official channels where I/we could target my
demands and complaints?
Ð
Is going to the courts likely to have an effect?
Ð
Do I/we have the time and resources?
Ð
Are there other actors I could take joint action with?
State response
(Substance of response types)
Do I think citizens have legitimate grievances? 
Ð
Do I hold responsibility for the particular public good?
Ð
Am I likely to be officially sanctioned due to citizen action?
Ð
Do I care about my reputation? 
(If not, possibility of reprisal)
Ð
Do I care about the service?
Ð
Do I think I can do something about the situation?
(If not, then could lead to helplessness)
Ð
Do I have the capacity and resources to take action?
(If not, then could lead to frustration)
Ð
Do I need others to contribute in
terms of resources/reforms?
Ð
Can I motivate others? Are others
likely to collaborate?
Do I have access to higher levels?
(Depends upon whether resources,
reformists are identifiable within
the system)
Ð
Reforms/increased resources
Ó
Additional potential outcomes
Empowered communities
Increased trust between citizens and state actors
Reduced corruption
Institutionalised channels for interaction
Responsive public officials
Increased legitimacy of the state
Figure 3 A preliminary causal chain: from information to state response 
Source Adapted and expanded from Lieberman et al. (2012).
I m p r o v e d  s e r v i c e s
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attributed to the intervention). To explore the
reasons for this finding, they developed an
analysis based on expanding the causal chain
between information and citizen action. When
simple survey and qualitative methods were used
to test whether assumptions behind each link in
the causal chain held true, they found that only
‘a minority – sometimes a very small minority – of
the subject population was reasonably likely to
advance down any single step of the causal
pathway towards increased citizen activism’
(Lieberman et al. 2012: 34/35).
Extending this and other work on theories of
change (Joshi et al. 2013; Tembo 2012), in Figure 3
I present a series of steps that are required for
information to lead to positive state responses.
Following Lieberman et al. (2012), each step is
posed as a question – for the relevant stakeholder
in the process. When the answer to any of the
questions is likely to be ‘no’, then the process of
translating information into citizen action faces a
roadblock. When the answer is ‘yes’ then there is
a greater chance of the desired outcome (in this
case improved service delivery) being achieved. It
goes without saying that these questions will have
distinct answers in diverse cases. Although the
causal chain is depicted here in a linear manner,
there may be various leaps in steps and some
looping in the chain in particular contexts.
The kind of analysis outlined above, that draws
out causal pathways relating specific components
of social accountability to each other can be
useful in arraying the existing evidence on the
impact of social accountability as well as in
providing a potential checklist of micro-factors to
consider before embarking on particular SA
initiatives. The task ahead is to begin a mapping
of mini-causal chains and mine existing studies
(both qualitative and quantitative) to unearth
the assumptions behind each step and the extent
to which they seem to hold true more generally.
Such work will also point to very simple pilot
research for testing assumptions, that could be
carried out prior to large-scale implementation
of initiatives, and prevent the likelihood of low
impacts.
One additional issue needs elaboration. Most
studies of impact are looking for the immediate
outcomes such as visible improvements in public
services. Yet implicit expectations of long-term
outcomes are many. As one recent paper put it:
[E]xpected results of social accountability
include a reduction in corruption, better
governance and policy design, enhanced voice,
empowerment and citizenship of marginalized
groups, responsiveness of service providers
and policy makers to citizens’ demands and
ultimately the achievement of rights, health
and developmental outcomes (Lodenstein et
al. 2013).
These expectations range from immediate short-
term ones to more durable long-term changes
within states and societies. Expectations range
from those focused on social actors
(empowerment, social cohesion, inclusive social
norms), to those focused on states (reduced
corruption, responsive officials, better policy
design, good governance) to those that improve
the space where social groups interact with the
state (institutionalised channels for
participation, increased trust, legitimacy
democratic deepening, better policy design) (see
Joshi forthcoming). The task then, is to
systematically identify all the potential impacts
one might be interested in to trace the extent
they might have been achieved in specific cases.
An important part of the reason for doing this
relates to our view of social accountability as ‘an
ongoing and collective effort to hold public
officials and service providers to account for the
provision of public goods which are existing state
obligations’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2008: 3). If one
views social accountability as part of a longer
political process of citizen engagement with the
state, then histories of prior engagement will
shape expectations of stakeholders, expectations
that will change over time. This relates closely to
the definitions of relevant outcomes and our
time frames of assessment: if a social
accountability intervention fails in improving
services but scores highly on empowerment of
citizens, do we consider it a failure or a success,
given that the intervention has changed the
long-term prospects for accountability by
changing the starting point for the next
intervention? Whose definitions of outcomes
count as they would be different for organic SA
initiatives and donor interventions? Tracing a
range of intermediate and ultimate outcomes is
important for understanding the long causal
chain of social accountability work, the impacts
that might be achievable and the contextual
factors that can influence ‘success’.
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6 Conclusions
Current social accountability practice has been
racing ahead of clear evidence of impact. The
paucity of studies of impact (although increasing
rapidly), the fragmentation of the data points,
the lack of comparative evidence, and the acute
shortage of mixed method studies, have all
contributed to a situation where there is a strong
normative belief in citizen-led accountability
without a clear understanding of the conditions
under which it can have impact.
Fox (2014) offers a good conceptual start for
addressing this, by identifying in an inductive
fashion, based on existing studies, several
analytical distinctions, lessons from the evidence
and new terms to guide further thinking and
operational work. From his list, several general
ones stand out. There is the overarching
distinction between strategic approaches (enabling
environments for collective action) and tactical
approaches (localised, demand-side, information-
based tools) and the observation that so far most
accountability work has been located in the tactical
domain. Another one is the appeal to move beyond
the local, not just in strengthening state capacity,
but also strengthening citizen capacity to make
accountability work vertically up – beyond the
local. Finally there is the need to not forget
democratic electoral accountability and its links
with social accountability, as ultimately, the goal is
to make the political system work better. These
ideas need to be taken up and internalised in
operational work.
Central to the debate is the issue of context. As
we saw in this article, there are particular
challenges to any attempts to identify contextual
factors. Foremost, ‘context’ is a loose term and
can relate to any relevant condition. The critical
task of course is how to identify which are the
‘critical’ contextual factors.
A two-pronged approach to the study of context
seems to be emerging. On the macro side, and
closely aligned to PEA is an approach that
examines the existing literature to identify
patterns of enabling and constraining contextual
factors in broad domains (O’Meally 2013). On
the other hand is an approach that attempts to
unpack particular causal chains and the micro-
contextual conditions that seem to make them
work. As work on the former is relatively well
developed, this article has attempted to develop
the latter and start to flesh out some of the
issues and challenges that lie ahead.
The approach to context outlined here is distinct
from attempting to understand the contextual
conditions under which ‘labelled’ interventions
such as community scorecards or social audits
work. Focusing on ‘labelled’ interventions is
problematic because most often such
interventions are not actually alike in their
individual components: rather they share only a
broad approach. Instead, by deconstructing the
various mini-causal pathways (akin to strands in
DNA) and understanding the contextual
conditions that make them work, we could
potentially recombine the existing evidence to
assess the promise of specific existing and new
initiatives. In addition, existing initiatives could
be assessed for the extent to which they travelled
along the causal chain – and where the
roadblocks to impact lay. Such an approach also
ties in more closely with the more explicitly
political and organic analysis suggested in the
discussion of macro factors, and is rooted in
specificities of the histories and norms of
particular contexts.
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Notes
1 By ‘initiatives’ I mean both: organic citizen
initiatives to demand accountability outside
formal channels as well as external
‘interventions’ that aim to foster citizen
demand for accountability.  I use the term
‘intervention’ specifically when labelled
initiatives such as community scorecards, etc.
is meant.
2 www.thefreedictionary.com/context (accessed
7 July 2014).
3 www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/
british/context (accessed 7 July 2014).
4 www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/context (accessed 7 July 2014).
5 By micro-context, I mean the factors often
identified in the macro-strategy for their
operation at the micro level. This is important
because even if the overall climate in a
country is favourable for SA-type action, at
the local level it might not be. For example,
while a country might have a free and fair
media, at the local level the newspapers might
be controlled by particular groups opposed to
greater accountability (see Schultze-Kraft and
Morina in this IDS Bulletin). Or particular
1 Joshi_Schultze-Kraft IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:50  Page 33
groups/communities may not have access to
newspapers, radio or TV, or might be
illiterate.
6 Credit for this point and the earlier point
about comparative information, goes to the
CSO Twaweza (www.twaweza.org), whose
thinking in this area was elaborated for me by
Varja Lipovsek (pers. comm. 2013).
7 Even work based on such recent advances
might be limiting. Some ground-breaking
experimental research in diverse populations
about societal interactions and rational
interest suggests our knowledge of human
behaviour is based on studies of cultural
‘outlier’ populations – W.E.I.R.D. – Western,
Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic
(Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010).  Most
of humanity might be operating on other
cultural principles.
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